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INTRODUCTION
Liability for consequential losses in the law of contract has traditionally been
limited by a peculiar contractual view of legal causation, or remoteness.
Hence while a particular breach of contract may be the factual (‘but for’)
cause of a particular item of damage, that item may be deemed to be too
remote to warrant a claim for compensation. The traditional test used in the
remoteness inquiry was adopted by the Appellate Division in Lavery & Co Ltd
v Jungheinrich 1931 AD 156 (see further the less expansive adoption of a
contemplation principle with regard to damages in Victoria Falls and Transvaal
Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1 at 22). In the
main judgment given in Lavery, Curlewis JA imported the English law
approach to remoteness, the so-called ‘rule in Hadley v Baxendale’ ((1854) 9
Exch 341. This rule was adopted in Lavery supra by Curlewis JA at 162–4 and
by Wessels JA (for the majority) at 174). In the original form (see Hadley v
Baxendale (supra) at 354, per Alderson B) this rule stated that recoverable
damages were
‘such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, ie
according to the usual course of things, from [the] breach of contract itself, or
such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of it’.
A close reading of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale reveals that it is in fact two
rules, the first dealing with the position where damages ‘arise naturally
according to the usual course of things’ and the second from where the
damages could ‘reasonably be supposed to have been within the contempla-
tion of both parties at the time they made the contract’. In the conventional
remoteness discourse, the first rule applies to ‘general’ damages and the
second to ‘special’ damages (compare Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas
1976 (2) SA 545 (A) at 550B–E). In the Shatz Investments case (supra), the
199
JOBNAME: SALJ12 Part2 PAGE: 2 SESS: 6 OUTPUT: Wed May 30 13:32:34 2012
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2012−Part2/00notes
Appellate Division confirmed the distinction between general and special
damages. General damages represent the losses which the ‘law presumes that
the parties contemplated . . .’ as a result of the breach, while special damages
represent those losses which would ordinarily be considered too remote, but
which in the ‘special circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract,
the parties actually or presumptively contemplated’ (Shatz Investments (supra)
at 550B–E). This distinction was confirmed in Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd
v Roberts Construction Co Ltd 1977 (3) SA 670 (A) at 687 (see also paras 46–50
of Thoroughbred Breeders’Association v Price Waterhouse 2001 (4) SA 551 (SCA),
per Nienaber JA).
By way of illustration, Pothier cites the example of a contract for the sale of
a horse (Pothier Obligations vol 1, part 1, ch 2, art 3, para 161 — translated by
William David Evans (1853)). If the seller breaches the contract and fails to
deliver the horse timeously, he will be liable in damages for a subsequent
increase in the price of horses due to a shift in the market, should the buyer
have to procure a horse from a different seller. This would be general
damages, since anyone in the buyer’s position would suffer this loss. Should
the buyer be a canon, however, and due to the failure of the seller to deliver
the horse, the canon is unable to collect his tithes at the appointed time and
place, this consequential loss would be special damages since it arises because
of the particular circumstances of the plaintiff. According to the rule in
Hadley v Baxendale, the canon would only be able to claim for this loss if the
seller knew of the nature of his profession (and perhaps also of the necessity of
a horse for the collection of tithes) at the time of conclusion of the contract of
sale.
As the above example illustrates, the traditional Hadley v Baxendale
approach to damages relies on the actual or imputed foresight of loss by the
defendant at the time of contracting (known as the ‘contemplation’ princi-
ple). In South Africa a further rider was placed upon this test by Wessels JA in
the original Lavery case: namely that the defendant must also have accepted
liability for this type of damage at the time of contracting (Lavery (supra) at
175). This further requirement, which had the stamp of approval of the
majority of the court, represents an embellishment on the Hadley principle
and came to be known as the ‘convention principle’. This rule seems to have
its origins in Pothier (Obligations vol 1, part 1, ch 2, art 3, para 162) and a
certain amount of case support in English law (eg British Columbia Saw Mills
Co v Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499 at 509; Horne v Midland Ry (1873) LR 8
CP 131 at 139,145; and Elbinger Aktiengesellschaft v Armstrong (1874) LR QB
473 at 478). However, such rule has been criticised (although not actually
overruled) in subsequent Appellate Division cases as well as by academic
commentators (see Shatz Investments (supra) at 552–4; Thoroughbred Breeders’
(supra) para 51; J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 ed
(1992) 227–8). There is thus scope for development of the law of remoteness
in South African law, as was foreshadowed by Nienaber JA in Thoroughbred
Breeders’ (supra) paras 51–2. This argument has the support of Schalk van der
Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract —
General Principles 3 ed (2007) 431–3). This point will be developed below.
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English law has also not been static since the Hadley decision in the
mid-nineteenth century. Two landmark judgments were handed down by
the House of Lords in the twentieth century, namely Victoria Laundry
(Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 and Koufos v
Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350. These cases developed the
rule in Hadley v Baxendale by refining the degree of foresight necessary to
qualify as ‘contemplation’ of the loss ultimately occurring. These cases
established that a substantial degree of foresight on the part of the defendant is
necessary, which was described by Lord Reid in The Heron II as being damage
which was ‘not unlikely’ to occur as a result of the breach (The Heron II
(supra) at 383). ‘Not unlikely’ denoted ‘a degree of probability considerably
less than an even chance but nevertheless not very unusual and easily
foreseeable’ (ibid). Once the degree of likelihood of the harm foreseen had
been established, it would be possible to determine whether it was such as
would flow naturally from the act of breach (ie general damages), or whether
some further special circumstances known to the parties would be necessary
to impute liability to the defendant (ie special damages) (The Heron II (supra)
at 385). Recent common law commentators have criticised this approach as
being largely semantic and unhelpful (eg Adam Kramer ‘An agreement-
centred approach to remoteness and contract damages’ in Nili Cohen &
Ewan McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for Breach of Contract (2005)
249 at 273–4 and Andrew Tettenborn ‘Hadley v Baxendale foreseeability: A
principle beyond its sell-by date?’ (2007) 23 Journal of Contract Law 120 at
136–7), but these developments by the House of Lords indicate an increase in
the specificity of the remoteness test, particularly with regard to the
foreseeability threshold.
Thus, in sum, English law is the origin of the current South African
position on remoteness in contract with the exception of the convention
principle, which appears to have developed locally directly from Pothier.
Indeed, the rule in Hadley v Baxendale provides the basis for limiting
contractual damages in many common law and even civil law countries
around the world (this is demonstrated convincingly by Kramer op cit at
249). The latest House of Lords decision in point is thus highly relevant,
particularly since two of the law lords attempted to revise the traditional
doctrine. The approach of Lord Hoffmann (concurred in by Lord Hope) in
Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas) [2008] 3 WLR
345, [2008] UKHL 48, seems to indicate a shift in the direction of what
would be called the ‘convention principle’ in South Africa. This is an
interesting shift since our own country seems intent on abandoning this rule
(see the sources cited above such as Thoroughbred Breeders’ (supra) and Van der
Merwe et al op cit). This contribution will evaluate the separate judgments in
The Achilleas and weigh them against a possible South African re-evaluation,
as presaged by Nienaber JA in Thoroughbred Breeders’.
THE ACHILLEAS
In this case the owners of a bulk carrier vessel (the respondents) chartered
their ship to the appellants (the charterers). The charter-party was entered
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into in January 2003 and was extended in September of that year for a further
five to seven months. The daily hire rate was fixed at $13 500. The return
date was later set at 2 May 2004, but the vessel was returned late on 11 May
2004. Prior to the return date, the owners had entered into a further contract
for the lease of the ship to a third party to begin immediately after the return
of the ship and at a daily rate of $39 500. This contract was to run for four to
six months. The large discrepancy between hire rates was explained as being
due to the volatility of the charter-party market. The contract with the third
party was not cancelled, but was rather renegotiated to begin on 11 May
2004. Due to a market decline, however, the daily rate in this subsequent
contract was fixed at only $31 500. The owners claimed from the charterers
for the $8 000 dollar per day difference for the entire period of the
subsequent fixture, which amounted to $1.36 million.
Despite evidence that the custom in the shipping market was to pay
damages only for the period by which the return of the ship was overdue, the
arbitrators, as well as the High Court and the Court of Appeal, found for the
owners. On appeal to the House of Lords, however, all five judges found for
the appellant charterers. Five separate speeches were delivered, of which two
found for the charterers based on the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, two further
went in their favour based on the notion that the charterers had not assumed
liability for a risk of this magnitude, and a final speech basically concurred in
the reasons of both approaches set out above.
The basis of Lord Hoffmann’s opinion (and to a large extent the separate
concurring opinion of Lord Hope) was that the extent of a party’s liability for
damages was to be ‘founded upon the interpretation of the particular contract
. . . as a whole, construed in its commercial setting’ (The Achilleas (supra) para
11, following authorities and academic writings). This was because ‘anyone
asked to assume a large and unpredictable risk [would] require some
premium in exchange’ (ibid para 13). Lord Hoffmann relied on his earlier
decision in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (sub
nomine South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd)
[1997] AC 191 (SAAMCO), a case dealing with professional negligence, to
pose the question as to whether the defendant had assumed liability for the
‘kind’ or ‘type’ of loss which was claimed in the case at hand (ibid para 15). In
terms of this principle, Lord Hoffmann held in SAAMCO that the duty of
care imposed on the defendant in terms of the nature of his contractual
undertaking (in that case the valuation of property as a service to a bank who
intended to pass a mortgage bond over that property) should not be greater
than he thought (or could reasonably be expected to have thought) he was
undertaking (SAAMCO at 212, cited in The Achilleas (supra) para 15).
Hence, although a party may be held liable for damages which are
foreseeably or unforeseeably large in terms of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale, it
may not be held liable if those damages are not of the type for which it
assumed liability (The Achilleas (supra) para 21). This principle seems to have
been echoed by the Court of Appeal in a subsequent case where the risk
unforeseen loss — flooding of a basement due to the simultaneous failure of
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fail-safe devices — was held to have been contractually assumed by the
manufacturer of a sprinkler system (see Supershield Ltd v Siemens Building
Technologies FE Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 7, [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 349 para 45).
Since the expectations of the parties were in accord with customary
practice within the charter-party market, the defendant would not have
thought it was undertaking liability for damages of the type which was sought
by the owners and hence the charterers’ appeal should be upheld (The
Achilleas (supra) paras 23–4 (Lord Hoffmann) and 34–6 (Lord Hope)).
The opinion of Lord Rodger was based firmly on the rules in Hadley v
Baxendale. It was within the contemplation of the charterers that if they
returned the ship late, they would have to pay the hire costs for the additional
days (ibid para 54). The nature of the market was such, however, that they
could safely assume that there would be a subsequent charter-party with a
third party and hence a payment of damages for the overdue period might
not be at the hire rate, but at a higher market rate (ibid). This was also the
accepted position in shipping law and was based on the assumption that the
owners would be able to obtain a charter-party at a later date. Hence the
damages of this type would constitute those falling under the first rule in
Hadley v Baxendale (general damages), since they were likely to eventuate as
the ‘ordinary consequence’ of the breach in question (ibid paras 59–60). The
damages claimed by the owners, however, would not have been within the
reasonable contemplation of the charterers’ at the time of conclusion of the
contract as they were likely to arise out of late delivery and hence were too
remote (ibid para 60).
Lord Walker gave his own reasons for upholding the appeal, but concurred
in the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope and Lord Rodger (ibid para
87). Finally, Baroness Hale also upheld the appeal, but preferred the
reasoning of Lord Rodger. She expressly distanced herself from the reasoning
of Lord Hoffmann, arguing that his incorporation of the principle in the
SAAMCO case would introduce rules from professional negligence into
contract law (ibid para 93). This had not been explored in argument before
the court, but stemmed largely from academic writing which had been cited
particularly in Lord Hoffmann’s opinion (ibid).
COMMENT ON THE ACHILLEAS
As Peel notes, the lack of a clear direction on remoteness in contract from the
House of Lords in The Achilleas is unfortunate (Edwin Peel ‘Remoteness
revisited’ (2009) 125 LQR 6 at 12.) The interesting feature of this case,
however, is the reasoning employed by Lord Hoffmann and concurred in by
Lord Hope. A South African readership will be struck immediately by the
endorsement of the convention principle, which has long been maligned in
our own country.As Baroness Hale demonstrated, this development seems to
owe a lot to academic writing. Lord Hoffmann cites three articles in his
opinion (Kramer op cit, Tettenborn op cit and Andrew Robertson ‘The basis
of the remoteness rule in contract’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 172). As Lord
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Hoffmann pointed out (The Achilleas (supra) para 11) these sources provide a
very helpful critique of remoteness in contract, with the first two articles
cited, those by Kramer and Tettenborn, coming out in favour of something
akin to the convention principle and the third, by Robertson, arguing instead
for an allocation of risks by the courts based on information beyond what can
be gleaned from the parties’ contract. The Robertson article seems most
helpful in the SouthAfrican context where the impetus is to move away from
the convention principle.
Robertson sets out to disprove the convention principle, for which, he
demonstrates, there is currently a good deal of support in the common law
world (Robertson op cit at 173–5). He argues instead that the remoteness
principle represents a gap-filling device, where judicial discretion fills a
lacuna left open in the parties’ contract (ibid at 175–81). A tacit term can
usually not be found here, he argues, since the parties simply did not think of
the eventuality in question (ibid at 180). (In South Africa it would be possible
to impute an intention to the parties following Van den Berg v Tenner 1975 (2)
SA 268 (A), but this does not seem right here either.) The purpose of the
remoteness rule is not only to allocate risks, but also to ensure a just result
(Robertson op cit at 184). Robertson makes a lot of the role of fairness in the
remoteness determination, arguing that while it is imprecise, this imprecision
can be cured by a judge giving detailed reasons for his exercise of discretion
(ibid at 190). He lists a few possible examples of these, the most notable being
commercial practice and the availability of possible methods of insurance
(ibid at 192).
What is more interesting about Lord Hoffmann’s opinion is the purported
linkage between the determination of contractual remoteness and that of
professional negligence. This represents a convergence of remoteness in tort
and contract of the type foreshadowed in the South African case law in
Thoroughbred Breeders’ ((supra) paras 51–2, per Nienaber JA). If tort and
contract were to converge, however, surely there should be a move away
from looking merely to the contract to determine the extent of liability? In
Parsons (Livestock) Ltd v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd [1978] QB 791 Lord Denning
suggested that remoteness in contract should depend on the type of loss
caused — if it was economic loss, a higher degree of foresight of possible
harm was required on the part of the defendant than if the loss was to person
or property, where the lower standard of foresight required for remoteness in
tort would suffice (ibid at 802–3). This type of analysis clearly focuses on the
harm suffered, rather than any interpretation of the contract, and therefore
represents a choice based on policy factors.
To illustrate how reasonable foreseeability alone does not always produce
the correct answer to the remoteness problem, Peel cites the textbook
example of a taxi driver engaged to drive a businessman to the airport to
catch a plane to an important meeting (Peel op cit at 10). If the taxi driver, in
breach of contract, does not get the businessman to the airport on time he is
not liable for the full extent of damages consequent on missing the meeting
(ibid). The reason for this (according to Lord Hoffmann’s approach) is that
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the taxi driver did not ‘accept the risk’ for this type of damage (ibid). One
might add that the taxi fare was not commensurate with accepting this type of
risk and hence the businessman cannot shift the burden of his loss onto the
driver. Peel argues that other factors such as policy considerations of what is
‘reasonable’ or ‘proper’ based on the facts of the case might also solve this
conundrum (ibid). One might argue thus that normative factors play a
greater role in the determination of liability in the taxi driver’s case than any
contractual assumption of risk theory — pointing to a judicial policy decision
being the determinant of liability rather than convention. The merits in Lord
Hoffmann’s opinion (with respect) may lie in its referral to objective market
based factors and other external indicators apart from reasonable foreseeabil-
ity to determine liability. The problem with Hadley v Baxendale is that it
draws too strongly on reasonable foreseeability, rather than viewing the
transaction against the backdrop of the full surrounding circumstances, as
well as policy considerations, to determine the extent of liability. In a way this
represents a convergence with tort in that the contract itself becomes of
secondary importance and policy factors come to the fore.
Lord Hoffmann argues that remoteness should ask the question whether
the defendant has assumed liability for the type or kind of risk at hand (see the
summary of The Achilleas case (supra) above). This is to be determined from
the contract at hand, market expectations and the price charged. Peel notes
that although evidence about the actual contractual intentions of the parties
may be difficult to come by, an economic analysis of remoteness in contract
may be useful (Peel op cit at 11). Indeed, economic factors should play an
important role if loss is to be allocated on a more flexible basis. Law and
economics scholars, such as Posner, have argued for contractual remoteness
to be determined based on which party is the most efficient loss avoider
(Richard Posner An Economic Analysis of Law 5 ed (1998) at 140–1). This
point will be developed in the discussion of South African law in the
following part of this note.
The convention principle has been rightly questioned in the South African
courts, for the reasons that it is too strict on the plaintiff and requires too high
a standard of proof where there might be little evidence to establish a tacit
term. Rather than focusing on the traditional enquiry as to what the express
terms of the contract are, or failing this, what terms are so obvious as to go
without saying (the ‘officious bystander’ test), the focus in the remoteness
inquiry should move beyond the intentions of the parties to what the market
requires and who is the better loss avoider. It is this major criticism which can
be leveled against the reasoning of Lord Hoffmann and it is on this basis that
the obiter dicta of Nienaber JA in Thoroughbred Breeders’ are to be preferred.
Hence, since the focus of this note is on revision of the remoteness test, it will
close with suggestions for the revision of this principle in South Africa.
REMOTENESS IN CONTRACT UNDER REVISION IN SOUTH
AFRICA TOO?
In a minority opinion in Thoroughbred Breeders’, the latest word from the
Supreme Court of Appeal on this topic, Nienaber JA reviewed the authori-
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ties relating to remoteness in contract (Thoroughbred Breeders’ (supra) paras
46–53). He came to the conclusion that it was not necessary in that case to
overhaul the rules in Hadley v Baxendale as evinced in the South African case
law, but nevertheless expressed an opinion as to the direction in which he
thought remoteness should move. Nienaber JA’s suggestion was that the
flexible test of legal causation, which was based on a conglomeration of
various tests with a good deal of judicial discretion and policy considerations
thrown in, should be employed in contract in the same way as it is in criminal
law, delict, insurance and perhaps even estoppel (ibid para 51). He went on to
spell out this approach as being based largely on ‘reasonable foreseeability’ (by
the defendant at the time of contracting, or where appropriate, the time of
breach), along with ‘practical common sense based on the judicial officer’s
years of experience’ (ibid para 52).
This approach reflects the criticism of De Wet & Van Wyk that the
appropriate time for the determination of foreseeability is the time of the
breach, rather than the conclusion of the contract (De Wet & Van Wyk op cit
at 227). Rather than adopting this rule verbatim, however, a conciliatory nod
is given in its direction to the extent that it will apply where applicable. Also
reflected in Nienaber JA’s opinion is a willingness to abandon the convention
principle — also in line with the criticism of De Wet & Van Wyk (ibid. See
also Van der Merwe et al op cit at 432). Despite the support offered to this
principle by Lord Hoffmann, the interpretation of the contract (including the
determination of the existence of tacit terms) should be no more than a factor
in determining remoteness, as argued above in the comment on The Achilleas.
The convergence of the determination of remoteness in contract and
delict should not be lamented in South Africa. Despite the reluctance of
Baroness Hale to endorse this suggestion (see the previous part of this note
above), the support shown for this by Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope (as
well as the weighty support of Lord Denning in Parsons) indicates that this
trend is not unique to South Africa. The causing of harm to another as a
consequence of a delict is not far removed from loss due to the breach of a
contract, since both actions cause losses to the plaintiff which are compens-
able in a civil suit and are limitable by reference to principles of legal
causation. Following the recognition of liability for pure economic loss in the
law of delict, even the nature of the wrongfully caused harm is comparable.
The question is essentially how to limit liability and, if this is to be by a
fettered form of judicial discretion, then how exactly to guide that discretion.
In delict various tests exist for remoteness, with one of the most important
of these being the reasonable foreseeability of harm. A measure of discretion
is permitted in judicial decision-making to ensure that the boundaries of
liability do not exceed what is reasonable, fair and just in the circumstances
(International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) at 700–1,
adopting the ‘flexible’ test for remoteness into delict from the earlier criminal
case, S v Mokgethi 1990 (1) SA 32 (A)). If there is to be convergence between
these approaches, then the contractual principles as found in the rule in
Hadley v Baxendale should not be jettisoned entirely, since the enquiry here
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too rests on foreseeability. Thus, as per Nienaber JA’s dicta, reasonable
foreseeability will continue to play an important role, particularly with regard
to general damages. With special damages, however, the element of flexibil-
ity is more important and the need to determine the proper allocation of risks
all encompassing. The criterion of what is just, reasonable and fair — a
formula inviting an exercise of discretion — becomes of utmost importance.
One might argue that if one were to abandon the Hadley v Baxendale
approach and simply apply a flexible test for remoteness, the distinction
between general and special damages would no longer be of importance. To
a certain extent this may be so, but if the flexible test truly is a conglomera-
tion of all the previously suggested theories, then Hadley v Baxendale could
still be applied, subject to the rider that the outcome must be congruent with
the demands of public policy. Thus the established case law on general and
special damages would guide judges, and need not be jettisoned.
Fairness in contracting has become a catch-word of recent times, follow-
ing the Constitutional Court decision in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323
(CC). Although it may have appeared that fairness was a requirement in
contracting following this case, this interpretation was curtailed by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2010 (4)
SA 468 (SCA) (see especially para 50). Of course, the determination of
remoteness in contract involves fairness as imposed by a judicial officer, as
opposed to fairness in the enforcement of contractual rights by one party, but
the jurisprudence surrounding the concept of fairness should still provide an
informative basis as to how to exercise policy decisions. Are we then to
follow Barkhuizen and say that it all depends on a balancing of constitutional
values as to how remoteness is to be determined? This would be a rather
vague standard and would need qualification. Parties to a contract base their
consensus on the negotiated terms before them, as well as on the circum-
stances surrounding their transaction, such as the prevailing market condi-
tions and trade customs. Thus the suggestion by Lord Hoffmann that these
should be influential considerations when making decisions in this context is
(with respect) most enlightening. Thus public policy and the notions of
justice, reasonableness and fairness which it entails should be one of the
factors used in determining remoteness, but other influences such as the
economic considerations (alluded to above) should be considered too.
A final consideration needs to be given to the work of law and economics
scholars in this field, since the line taken by judges with regard to remoteness
in awarding damages is likely to have a profound effect on the behaviour of
contracting parties in drafting contracts and reaching agreement on the
proper allocation of contractual risks. If one accepts the premise that one of
the leading goals in contract law should be economic efficiency, as law and
economics scholars posit, this colours one’s view of the remoteness rules. As
set out above, Posner argues that the rules of remoteness should be structured
so as to ensure that the risk of loss is borne by the most efficient loss avoider
(Posner op cit at 140–1). Hence, if it is cheaper for the plaintiff to take
precautions against incurring loss than to recover that loss from the defendant
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in damages, then perhaps no recovery should lie (ibid). Posner argues that as
the rule in Hadley v Baxendale is applied at present, the duty to take
precautions against loss should lie with the plaintiff if the knowledge of the
attendant risks is solely within his contemplation (ibid). If the plaintiff thinks
it would be cheaper to pass this risk to the defendant, he should expressly
inform him of the attendant risks, passing the burden of risk to him (ibid).
How would this apply to the example used earlier of the taxi driver who
transports the businessman to the airport? Clearly loss is most easily avoided
by the businessman departing timeously for the airport or some other form of
contingency plan. If he informs the taxi driver of the risk one still feels that
some overriding criterion of fairness should limit the taxi driver’s liability,
unless a taxi fare is charged which is commensurate with his risk. Practical
economics is likely to prevail here, as even in this hypothetical example the
ridiculousness of trying to hold a taxi driver liable in this situation is obvious.
It would be clear on standards such as what is reasonable (as suggested by Peel
op cit at 10) or, to use the language of Barkhuizen, what public policy
requires, that liability should not be imposed in this type of scenario.
A more detailed economic analysis of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale has
been undertaken by Eisenberg (Melvin Aron Eisenberg ‘The Principle of
Hadley v Baxendale’ (1992) 80 California LR 563). Eisenberg presents an
argument that in both contract and tort remoteness is determined by
foreseeability; it is just the degree of foreseeability which differs (Eisenberg
op cit at 567). He argues that the determination of the appropriate degree of
foreseeability required should not depend on whether the action is brought
in contract or tort, but ‘on the nature of the interest invaded and the wrong
involved’ (ibid at 568). This argument has a lot in common with the
judgment of Lord Denning in Parsons (supra). Eisenberg also offers useful
criticism of Posner’s thesis along the lines that economic efficiency on the
part of the plaintiff is caused by over-reliance on the availability of damages
(op cit at 582–3). Practical economics (or a consideration of what is
reasonable on the facts) would dictate that the degree of reliance on the part
of the plaintiff would be determined by the likelihood of breach by the
defendant (ibid). Thus one reverts to reasonable foreseeability not only on
the part of the defendant, but also on the part of the plaintiff, which spreads
the burden and is possibly fairer on both parties. Thus a special risk known
only to the plaintiff (special damages) should be disclosed to the defendant or
contemplated by him to spread or transfer this risk. If the plaintiff fails to
disclose this risk and does not take adequate precautions against its occur-
rence, the loss should lie with him.
As is often the case with law and economics arguments, it is easy to get lost
in abstraction. However, some points of practical relevance are highlighted
by Posner and Eisenberg and illustrate (if nothing else) that the economic
implications of an exercise of judicial discretion in determining remoteness in
contract must be considered. Economics should not be the only factor
considered, however, but should rather play a role in determining what the
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requirements of public policy are. This would ensure that the ultimate result
is not only economically justifiable, but also reasonable and fair.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note was to draw attention in South Africa to the latest
development in the law of remoteness in contract in English law. Particularly
the opinion of Lord Hoffmann in The Achilleas is remarkable for moving
away from the separation between the tests for remoteness in contract and
tort and for introducing a greater element of objectivity in the form of
market considerations to the test for reasonable foresight. The lack of a clear
majority in this case is lamentable, but the move away from traditional Hadley
v Baxendale analysis is noteworthy. In South Africa, of course, this trend has
been a possibility since Thoroughbred Breeders’ ten years ago. While this author
does not entirely support the approach of Lord Hoffmann, particularly with
regard to its adoption of the convention principle, his search for factors
beyond mere reasonable foreseeability to guide the exercise of the element of
judicial discretion in determining remoteness is useful. If remoteness is to be
determined by justice, reasonableness and fairness, then economic consider-
ations as alluded to by Lord Hoffmann should play an important role.
Reasonable foreseeability alone is not sufficient to determine remoteness and
the intricacies of the test in Hadley v Baxendale also do not entirely solve this
problem. An element of judicial discretion is required, and the peg upon
which to hang this is the considerations of public policy.
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‘Education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough
to assume responsibility for it and by the same token save it from the ruin
which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the new and young, would
be inevitable.’ (Hannah Arendt ‘The crisis in education’ in Between Past and
Future (1961) 193.)
INTRODUCTION
This note is a joint venture between a student in his third year of studies at
the University of Pretoria Faculty of Law and someone who has been
teaching law in that Law Faculty since 1999. Several conversations about
the need for critical thinking in law schools and our shared experience of the
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